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collaboration. Such collaboration, however, needs to be 
synchronized and adjusted to avoid preventable medical 
and non-medical consequences. Simulation exercises might 
be one important source to improve such collaboration.
Keywords Civilian–military · Trauma · Terrorism · 
Collaboration · Simulation · Exercise
Introduction
The increasing risk of natural disasters, as well as, major 
incidents created by human, such as terror attacks, indi-
cates a need for collaboration between different agencies [1, 
2]. In 2010, during the devastating flooding, which killed 
2000 people and affected 20 million people, the Pakistani 
military troops were mobilized to collaborate and assist 
the civilian agencies, e.g., healthcare. They accomplished 
immediate life-saving assistance, including rations from 
the military’s supplies as well as field hospitals and relief 
camps. Other examples of civilian–military (CM) collabo-
ration are Thailand during the Indian Ocean tsunami 2004, 
the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, and the 2010 Haiti earth-
quake [1].
Recent experiences from terrorist attacks worldwide, 
particularly in Europe (France 2015), have resulted in a 
search for better assessment of the needs, resources, and 
knowledge in the medical and non-medical management of 
these incidents [2, 6]. As the attacks vary in type, magni-
tude, and outcomes, and result in injuries, which are rarely 
treated in a civilian setting, the needs for a wider planning 
and CM healthcare collaboration is obvious. The CM col-
laboration in the medical management of victims is often 
high lightened and mentioned as one of the major cause of 
a successful outcome [2–7].
Abstract 
Purpose Disasters and major incidents demand a multi-
disciplinary management. Recent experiences from terror-
ist attacks worldwide have resulted in a search for better 
assessment of the needs, resources, and knowledge in the 
medical and non-medical management of these incidents 
and also actualized the need for collaboration between 
civilian and military healthcare. The aim of this study was 
to evaluate the impact of the civilian–military collaboration 
in a Swedish context with the main focus on its non-medi-
cal management.
Method An exercise, simulating a foreign military attack 
centrally on Swedish soil, was designed, initiated, and con-
ducted by a team consisting of civilian and military staff. 
Data were collected prospectively and evaluated by an 
expert team.
Results Specific practical and technical issues were pre-
sented in collaboration between civilian and military staffs. 
In addition, shortcomings in decision-making, follow-up, 
communication, and collaboration due to prominent lack of 
training and exercising the tasks and positions in all mana-
gerial levels of the hospital were identified.
Conclusion Current social and political unrests and 
terror attacks worldwide necessitate civilian–military 
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Although CM collaboration is common in battle areas, 
especially within the field of healthcare, relatively few stud-
ies have scrutinized the effects of such collaboration from a 
civilian perspective [4, 5]. In all examples of overwhelm-
ing mass casualties, the civilian society is in dire need of 
support from military resources. However, the opposite 
situation may exist, i.e., the military might be in need of 
civilian healthcare resources during a military action. An 
assumption in such situation would be that such collabora-
tion puts the civilian medical community and trauma cent-
ers into a test. The challenges would be both medical and 
non-medical. The medical challenges would be: the knowl-
edge of damage control management at prehospital and 
hospital levels; the ability to treat immediate survivors with 
military injury patterns; the outcome of such treatment in 
terms of mortality and morbidity; etc [2, 5–10]. The non-
medical issues, such as command and control, communica-
tion, collaboration, logistic, information etc, are fairly well 
discussed in the literature, but few studies have prospec-
tively analyzed the impact of a CM collaboration in respect 
to these topics [3, 4, 6]. Some of the issues might be solved 
based on the facts and knowledge, and some by relying on 
the experience and background of involved managers at 
operational and tactical levels [11].
To analyze the non-medical outcomes of a CM collabo-
ration, the focus should mainly be on the organizational and 
logistic interface of the CM healthcare. Although there are 
many guidelines, which regulate CM collaboration, they 
are not adopted to conflicts in western countries. The Oslo 
guidelines developed in 1994 and updated in 2006 address 
only natural disasters in times of peace. The MDCA guide-
lines (guidelines on the use of military and civilian assets 
to support UN humanitarian activities in complex emergen-
cies) from 2003 are developed to suit humanitarian actions 
in countries, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, where the for-
eign military has been in the presence [12].
The aim of this paper was to analyze the outcomes of 
CM collaboration in a mutual exercise, in which mili-
tary casualties were brought to a civilian hospital for 
further care. The focus was mainly on the surge capac-
ity and organizational structure, command and control, 
participants knowledge about their responsibilities, func-
tions, and organizational belonging during a major inci-
dent, their ability of understanding the nature of issues that 
may appear during an incident, such as triage of resources, 
organizational maintenance, safety and communication, 
logistic, and the need and demands for developing CM 
collaboration.
The scenario used in this exercise was a foreign mili-
tary attack centrally on the western region of Sweden. A 
prominent industrial zone in Sweden with 1.6  million 
inhabitants, living in urban as well as rural, and scarcely 
populated areas with five major hospitals with emergency 
departments (ED) and emergency care competency [13]. 
Complementary care in some specialties (e.g., Neuro-
surgery, vascular surgery, etc) is provided by the univer-
sity hospital in Gothenburg; the only trauma center in the 
region. The attack generated a varying number of casualties 
(n = 28) with typical war injuries. They were transported 
by military helicopters, either as single victims or two on 
the same helicopter, from the field hospital/s to the trauma 
center in Gothenburg. They were all landed on the helipad 
and delivered to the civilian staff after a report exchange 
and were admitted through the ED on Monday 31 August 
2015, starting at 08:00 a.m.
Method and material
Evaluation template and observations
Data were collected prospectively using an evaluation tem-
plate based on CSCATTT [14]. This template consisted of 
the following sections: Command and control, Safety, Com-
munication, Assessment, Triage, Treatment, and Trans-
port were reviewed and evaluated by free text. Observers 
were allowed to comment all activities, pros, and cons and 
if possible, and evaluate any specific activity by giving a 
point between 1 and 10 on a VAS scale (10 = excellent).
During the observations, all observers accompanied and 
observed the military and hospital employees at different 
stations (see in the following) [15]. The raw data could be 
collected, even though the event itself proceeded relatively 
fast [16]. The analysis was carried out in three steps. First, 
we selected the relevant effects of military–civil integration 
within the exercise. In the second step, we coded the find-
ings. Then, we sorted and analyzed all the observations as 
a whole [17].
A total number of nine observers/evaluators were 
engaged in the evaluation of scenario and were localized at 
the following station;
Helipad The place for first communication between mil-
itary and civilian staff.
Transportation path From helipad to ED
ED The first place to examine, triage, and manage all 
victims at admission and trauma bay
Hospital command group (HCG) A group of decision 
makers, with local responsibilities to organize, assess, and 
maintain the local needs at the hospital.
The total time of observations was 63 h.
Results
The results indicating the shortcomings and the points for 
improving are given for each station. Since some of the 
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issues may be related to the shortcomings in hospitals con-
tingency plan and not CM collaboration, all issues were 
divided into issues related to CM collaboration (A) and 
those related to hospitals contingency plan (B).
Helipad
Issues related to CM collaboration
Reporting system Different reporting systems between 
military and civilian healthcare staff were identified. The 
military staff used ATMIST (Age of the patient, Time of 
the incident, Mechanism of injury, Injury, Signs, Treatment) 
or MIST (Mechanism of injury, Injury, Signs, Treatment), 
while civilian staff used SBAR (Situation, Background, 
Actual, Recommendations). This discrepancy in report-
ing resulted in misunderstanding, low situation awareness, 
missing vital patient information, and initiation of unnec-
essary measures. Five important points in the process of 
reporting (identifying right person to report to, silent min-
ute to absorb the information and let the report flow, content 
of the report, standardization of the report and documen-
tation) were particularly noted by observer/evaluator in ten 
randomly chosen red patients and were given a point on the 
VAS scale, as mentioned in “Method” (Table 1). The lack of 
standardization in the reports and a proper documentation 
were prominent.
Protocol There was no standardized protocol for reporting 
the patient’s medical history and/or medical signs between 
military and civilian staffs. This resulted in a hand-written 
report, which was time-consuming, hard to read and lacked 
vital information (Fig. 1).
Noise In comparison with a civilian helicopter, a mili-
tary helicopter never turns off its motor as practiced during 
the war. Consequently, the whole report was given under 
functioning helicopter and created a noisier environment in 
which key information was lost.
Military stretchers Patients were carried on military 
stretchers, which were supposed to be changed at the time 
of patient delivery with a similar one at the hospital. How-
ever, the military and civilian stretchers were not compat-
ible, and therefore, the military stretchers had to be returned. 
The process of off-loading patients from military stretchers 
and re-loading to a civilian stretcher was time-consuming 
and jeopardized the patient safety.
Table 1  Military-to-civilian 
reporting process on the helipad 
in ten randomly chosen red 
patients
10 = excellent
Patient A B C D E F G H I J Average
Identifying the right 
person to report
2 6 8 8 8 8 10 8 10 10 7.6
Silence minute 2 6 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8.8
Content of the report 4 6 8 8 8 8 10 8 8 10 7.8
Standardized report 2 4 4 4 4 4 8 4 4 8 4.2
Documentation 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 6 5.4
Fig. 1  Readability of the hand-written report
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Issues related to contingency plan
Wind During the exercise, it was very difficult to hold 
loose items, including triage tags, medical items, papers, 
etc, due to the winds and the turbulence from the helicopter. 
There was no covering area, which could protect patients 
and staff from rain, wind, and cold.
Hospital logistic; transport path to the ED
Related to CM collaboration
Medical resources Due to the high number of casual-
ties and consequent multiple helicopter landings, staff and 
instrument were not in place all the time. With each nurse 
leaving the scene, her replacement could delay, since they 
used the same path. In a daily and customary basis, there 
would be few helicopter arrivals, which can easily be han-
dled.
Reporting times The time for giving report was extremely 
short at the trauma bay (15 s) compared to report given on 
helipad (45 s). There were obvious problems with the pres-
entation of the hand-written report from the helipad area to 
the trauma team (Table 2). Looking at the same parameters 
in the process of reporting (identifying right person to report 
to, silent minute to absorb the information and let the report 
flow, content of the report, and standardization of the report 
and documentation); beside the lack of standardization and 




Table 3 shows the time from helicopter landing to the time 
when the patient was reported to the trauma room. The 
transport time varied between 9 and 16 (average 11.9) min. 
Delays occurred if elevators were not running fast. The 
time was much longer if two patients were delivered by the 
military helicopter. The table shows the time consumed for 
ten randomly chosen patients at different levels from land-
ing to the end of reporting at trauma bay. The last column 
shows the average of consumed time in each level.
Competency during patient transportation
Almost all patients were transported by a single nurse 
together with another caretaker with no medical knowl-
edge. Any deviation in patients’ vital signs could not be 
medically responded easily with only one nurse available.
Communication
The phone used by the nurse stopped working in periods 
during transportation and mainly in the elevator, thus 
leaving the sole nurse alone should anything severe hap-
pen. In eight out of ten victims, triaged as severe cases 
Table 2  Reporting time 
consumed in civilian–civilian 
reporting process for the 
patients in this study
10 = excellent
Patient A B C D E F G H I J Average
Identifying the person who 
receives the report
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Silence minute to let report flow 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Content of the report 4 4 4 8 6 8 8 1 6 6 5.5
Standardized report 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0.4
Documentation 6 2 6 6 4 6 4 2 4 4 4.4
Table 3  Time from helicopter 
landing until the patient is 
delivered to the ED
Patient A B C D E F G H I J Average
Helicopter lands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Start reporting on helipad +4 +4 +5 +2 +3 +4 +5 +3 +3 +4 3.7
End reporting on helipad +1 +0 +4 +1 +0 +1 +1 +1 +1 +0 1.0
At the elevator (helipad) +3 +2 +2 +1 +1 +3 +1 +1 +1 +1 1.6
Arrival at ED +4 +4 +4 +4 +4 +5 +5 +4 +4 +5 4.3
Start reporting at trauma bay +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +2 +1 +1 1.1
End reporting at trauma bay +0 +0 +0 +1 +0 +0 +0 +0 +1 +0 0.2
Total time (min) 13 11 16 10 9 14 13 11 11 11 11.9
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(red tags), there was a need for additional qualified staff 
during transportation to maintain the high quality and 





Teamwork and  organization Good situation awareness, 
initially common understanding of the incident, review of 
the mass casualty plan, and good preparation. However, 
with the arrival of victims, ED was transferred to a more 
disorganized area, stepwise, e.g., some of the staff could not 
find the way to the helipad. Traffic jam at the entrance and 
exit of the trauma bay area. There were two doors, but just 
one was used.
Information There was a misunderstanding about the 
number of casualties in many occasions, especially after 
a while when the number of receiving patients did not 
match the number of existing patients. The information 
given to the staff at trauma bay was scarce and many won-
dered where the patient come from? No one realized that 
the victims came from field hospitals. There was a lack 
of information about, where the victims went to and with 
which medical files? The exercise was over, however, no 
one knew who made the decision, when and why?
Communication Wrong numbers on the list delay the 
arrival of the surgeon and anesthesiologist. No connection 
to the emergency laboratory probably due to the network 
problem. Communication problem between staff on the 
helipad, ED, and intensive care unit concerning where to 
patients should be transported.
Documentation Only one secretary worked with docu-
mentation at trauma bay and she was overloaded. There 
was also a confusion about which admission template 
should be used, the ordinary one or the one designated 
for disaster?
Resources Neck stabilizing collars in the trauma bay were 
not enough.
The performance of ED at two levels, outside and inside 
trauma bay, based on a preplanned template with specific 
topics, is given in detail in Table 4. Points were given based 
on the VAS scale (Table 4).




Teamwork and  organization Smooth teamwork early in 
the process, in designated room, based on the hospitals´ dis-
aster and contingency plan, in a seemingly well-equipped 
room.
Communication Problem, especially concerning the level 
of preparedness.
Information They had a timely press release. However, it 
was unclear if the amount and content of released informa-
tion were known to the public, emergency medical services, 
others emergency departments, primary care, as well as 
internally?
Follow‑up Decision made or scenarios discussed were not 
followed up.
Instruments Problem with conference and communication 
devices sporadically.
The performance of HCG, based on a preplanned tem-
plate with specific topics, is given in detail in Table  5. 
Points were given based on the VAS scale (Table 5).
Discussion
A successful CM collaboration in the medical management 
of major incidents relies not only on the skills and knowl-
edge of the staff but also on non-medical compatibility and 
harmonization of both organizations. Maybe, the strongest 
message sent by this study is that any kind of multidisci-
plinary management should be harmonized and tested for 
compatibility by mutual planning, training and exercising 
[2, 18–21].
Different countries have different health care systems 
that may impact the military involvement in civilian disas-
ters and civilian involvement in military conflicts [2]. Some 
countries have military hospitals, which treat military staff 
and their families in peacetime and military casualties dur-
ing the war, and thus, military victims will not be treated 
in the civilian sector, e.g., USA. Other countries have no 
military hospitals and civilian hospitals are responsible for 
the treatment of military casualties, e.g., Israel. In Swe-
den, there are no military hospitals and emergency care is 
offered to the staff through full-time or part-time employed 
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military physicians and nurses in collaboration with the 
university hospitals. If necessary, patients can be referred 
to the hospitals for further assessment, treatment, and sur-
gical interventions. During an armed conflict or war, Swed-
ish army relies fully on the civilian resources [22].
The collaboration between civilian and military health-
care has long been discussed and recommended mainly due 
to the civilian healthcare’s economic austerity and its need 
for sharing resources in terms of manpower and medical 
devices, vehicles, etc. A new and important reason is the 
increasing number of terror attacks in last decade with new 
patterns of injuries (gunshot and explosives) that are totally 
new to the civilian healthcare [2, 6]. With an increasing 
number of social disturbances encumbering many countries 
and putting them in an everyday alertness, any involvement 
in an armed conflict implicates another burden to their 
healthcare that must be prepared for [2, 13, 23–27]. Such 
preparedness should be multidisciplinary planned, tested 
and conducted [18–20].
It is already known that the medical management of 
mass casualties needs special consideration and calls for a 
CM collaboration [2]; however, the non-medical collabo-
ration should also be prepared. In this study, by dividing 
our findings into CM collaboration-related and contingency 
plan-related issues, we could identify those issues that par-
ticularly should be addressed within the CM collaboration 
framework.
There was no surprise that most of the issues in the 
interface of CM collaboration occurred in the area, where 
they meet for the first encounter, i.e., helipad and during 
Table 4  Evaluation of ED’s 
organizational structure in VAS 
scale





 Decision-making ability 8 No follow-up and analysis
 Follow-up a decision 6 See above
 Team/organizational build-up 9 Initially good, but worsen with chaos
 Establishing contact with commanders 9 Excellent
 Working areas 5 Not good for commanding
 Resources 6 Scarce
 Individual equipment 8 Some lacking
 Information sharing 5 Unclear sometimes
 Cooperation between physicians 9
 Identifying receiver of the report 6 Who needs the information and how?
 Silence minute 1 None
 Standardized reporting template 1 None
 Written information 5 Not complete e.g. alerting level
 Assessment of the situation 5 Number of patients vs available beds
 Communication with other units 7
Inside trauma bay
 Team/organization build-up 7
 Admission of patients 4
 Working area 7 Long distance to helipad and intensive care unit
 Available resources 8 Not realistic, hard to measure
 Management of patients 8 ATLS-based
 Identifying receiver of information 8
 Silence minute 7 Most of the time
 Contents of the report 5 Large variation
 Report template 3 None
 Situation assessment 9
 ATLS guidelines 9 Yes
 Patients transported to known space 9 Yes
 Teamwork 9 Yes
 Equipment 9 Yes
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the transportation. Issues such as functioning helicopter 
during the reporting, non-compatible stretchers, different 
reporting systems, not only jeopardize patient’s safety but 
also creates unnecessary and time-consuming measures, 
which have an impact on the outcome of whole manage-
ment. The experience gained from recent attacks in France 
is good enough to realize that a harmonized multidiscipli-
nary approach is a necessity in the management of disasters 
and major incidents [2, 6]. Standardization is possible by 
introducing mutual protocols, training, and guidelines [20].
Other issues found in this report were directly related to 
the hospital and its contingency plan. The long transport 
path to the ED (256 m of underground culverts, including 
two elevators) is all structural issues that may jeopardize 
patient safety. Although the hospital had a valid and com-
prehensive plan, the people using it were not trained and 
familiar with the operational items. The lack of training 
and exercising the tasks and positions was prominent in 
this study and in different positions (e.g., how to perform 
the tasks, how to find the way to different sections, how to 
use various routines, how to identify the right partner for 
collaboration, and how to analyze and react to unplanned 
issues). This cannot be done by just a written text in a plan, 
and a good preparedness is achieved by being exposed to 
the possible event, new scenarios, exercises, and training 
[20, 21, 24].
To maintain a high level of preparedness, special con-
siderations should be paid to the preparedness pyramid, 
which identifies planning, infrastructure, knowledge, 
and capabilities as the major components [26]. Since 
all Swedish hospitals have both disaster plans and good 
infrastructure, the exercise itself gave us a chance to 
evaluate the level of knowledge and capabilities and thus 
complete the preparedness pyramid. Studying command 
and control, communication and collaboration at the 
hospital, the HCG showed good ability in commanding, 
group dynamic, and teamwork. However, they were not 
strong enough in control, communication, and collabora-
tion with other agencies or units. One of the major prob-
lems was the inability of following up various decisions 
or plans, which were made and discussed. Alongside the 
good discussion and democratic decision-making, it was 
often forgotten to point out a specific individual to follow 
a specific task and order [11, 23, 27–29].
Communication internally and externally was also 
weak and may be a reason why collaboration with other 
agencies was not in focus. Communication network was 
overloaded quickly. The process of paging different phy-
sicians did not work during the exercise. Overloaded tel-
ephone network and other problems with IP telephony 
have been emphasized in many studies. The former was 
recently reported in the terrorist attack in Brussels [2, 13, 
25].
The main goal for evaluation of ED was to assess the 
organizational structure and not the medical assessment 
of the victims. All patients were medically assessed by 
an experienced surgical team at trauma bay and based on 
ATLS guidelines. It is, however, important to emphasize 
that exercises with no real-time treatment schedule, with 
or without figurants or patient cards, cannot generate 
measurable parameters and thus are not fully evaluable.
Table 5  Evaluation of HCG in VAS scale points 1–10
10 = excellent
Action Point Comments
Obtaining information 7 Was received through telephone calls and meetings. However, information obtained was 
not shared adequately
Analyzing ability 7 High, but not in all functions
Decision-making ability 8 Very high, but not in all functions
Follow-up of decisions made 5 No clear follow-up routine including unclear distribution of tasks. Lack of visual over-
view of what, who, when and how?
Teamwork/organizational form 7 Good, including participation of all members in discussion, assessments, and suggestions
Supporting each other in an overloaded situation





Identifying report receiver 7 Very good
Reporting template 1 None
Written information 4 Not in all occasions
Situation assessment 9 Excellent
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Limitations
In this study, an observational method was used to study 
the exercise [15–17]. The main advantage of observing 
exercises is twofolds: (1) the possibility of following 
the event directly as it happens and (2) the documenta-
tion of the participant’s behavior from the arrival of the 
first unit until the situation is normalized and the exercise 
has ended [18–21]. This method is more favorable than 
a retrospective study in which post-event data collection 
can be difficult and the events can be viewed as vague 
reconstructions. In addition, the participants often have 
difficulty remembering exactly what happened, in what 
order things were done, and who did what [23, 28, 29]. 
The limitation with this method is, however, the observer 
himself, since the evaluation of the exercise is based on 
evaluator’s background, experience, and his/her ability to 
picture the whole working process without any involve-
ment and in a passive stance. Using free text as comment 
often express an individual perception and may also be 
individually comprehended.
Although we used VAS scale to measure some param-
eters, the points given are also individual-based. Some 
studies recommend measurable parameters and perfor-
mance indicators such as time consumed with different 
actions [27]. However, a quick decision does not neces-
sarily equal the right and best solution.
A better evaluation would be possible if the whole 
chain of actions, including prehospital care, triage, 
transport to the ED and from ED to the ward, could be 
involved. This would probably show even weaknesses at 
the prehospital level with impacts on the decision made 
at the hospital.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the immediate response to a major incident 
such as a terror attack is a combination of medical and non-
medical measures in a multidisciplinary manner. Although 
quick and appropriate medical intervention is vital for the 
survival of victims, the non-medical measures, such as 
establishing command and control, safety, proper commu-
nication, collaboration with other agencies, information, 
logistic, etc, are equally important. Any kind of multidis-
ciplinary approach, including CM collaboration, should be 
harmonized by mutual planning, training, and exercising.
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